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There is an increasing need to secure electronic communication.  This need is being met on workstations 
and servers, which have large amounts of memory, and a dedicated network connection.  Securing 
communication in mobile devices is a relatively new research area, and has different requirements than 
workstations and servers.  This project attempts to address these new requirements by incorporating 
security into the Many-to-Many Invocation (M2MI) library developed at the Rochester Institute of 
Technology (RIT) [KB02].   
Specifically, this project addresses adding encryption and decryption of M2MI method invocations using 
session keys.  It also addresses the methods of establishing and maintaining session keys based on 
communicating members sharing a common group authentication key.  This project leaves the 
establishment and maintenance of the common group authentication key(s) as a separate step, outside the 
scope of this project. 
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This project focuses on two steps for securing communication.  The first step is authenticating to whom 
you are talking.  The second is hiding the data that is being communicated so that only the sender and 
receiver(s) know what is being communicated.  These ideas are nothing new.  Authentication and 
encryption have been around for a while, and there are some strong algorithms in place for performing 
these two steps.  A relatively new area of security is secure group communication.  Within this field, 
secure group communication in an ad hoc network is an area of current research.  Ad hoc networks bring 
two challenges to secure group communication.  The first is the lack of a central server.  Central servers 
are typically used to provide the authentication step in establishing a secure communication channel.  
Maintaining membership lists and storing public keys of group members on the devices that want to 
communicate can overcome this problem.  This has drawbacks, especially in mobile ad hoc networks.  In 
mobile ad hoc networks, the memory sizes of communicating devices are typically quite limited, and are 
not capable of storing large membership lists or a large number of keys.  These limited capabilities are the 
second challenge. 
This project overcomes these challenges by splitting the authentication step into two phases.  The first 
phase involves establishing and maintaining group authentication keys.  Each device that will 
communicate in a mobile ad hoc network will store a group authentication key (or key pair) on the device 
for each group that it belongs to.  This group authentication key will be established and maintained while 
the device can communicate with a central server (either directly or via a host computer, then downloaded 
from the host computer using a secure communication channel, e.g. PDA cradle, IrDA, etc.).  As 
members of each group are added or removed, the device will get updates to the group authentication key 
when it connects to the central server (or host computer).  These group authentication keys must be kept 
securely on the device to prevent compromise.  Another project at RIT is currently addressing these issues 
[Bi03]. 
The second phase involves using these group authentication keys to establish a session key that will be 
used during a single group communication session.  All members of a group that have received the group 
authentication key will be able to participate.  Each member will use the group authentication key to 
perform an encrypted key exchange in establishing a session key.  Only members who have the 
authentication key will be able to comprehend the session key.  The protocol for performing this 
encrypted key exchange is described in this paper. 
The session key that is established with the encrypted key exchange will then be used to secure all 
communication among the group.  For this particular project, the data that is encrypted with the session 
key is the Many-to-Many invocations of the various test clients. 
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2 M2MI Overview 
This project focuses on M2MI, and as such, some background is needed on how M2MI works in order to 
understand the changes that were made.  This section gives a brief description of M2MI.  A more 
complete description is available in the OOPSLA paper on M2MI [KB02]. 
The M2MI library is broken up into two layers.  The top layer is called the M2MI layer, and is what the 
applications use to interface with the library.  The lower layer is called the M2MP layer, and is used for 
routing M2MI messages between applications. 
M2MI supports three types of communication: one-one, one-many, and many-many.  As with any 
electronic communication, an endpoint needs to be created in order to send out messages.  For M2MI, 
there are three types of endpoints: unihandles, multihandles, and omnihandles.  Unihandles are used for 
point-to-point communication.  Multihandles are used to multicast messages to a particular group of 
users.  Omnihandles are used to broadcast messages to everyone listening. 
As was implied with omnihandles, there must be an application out there listening for these messages 
being sent.  In M2MI, an application listens for messages by exporting an object that implements a 
specific interface.  The M2MI library maintains an export map, which maps the interface name to the 
object, or set of objects, that implement that interface within a particular application.  This way, when a 
message is received that contains that interface name, it can be forwarded to the object, or set of objects, 
that exported that interface.  In addition to storing the mapping of the interface name to the object, the 
M2MI library also creates a message filter object, which contains a hash of the interface name, and a 
“magic number” which is used to identify the message as an M2MI message.  This message filter object 
provides a filter in the M2MP layer of which messages the application would like to receive.  Only 
messages that contain exported interfaces will be sent from the M2MP layer to the M2MI layer.  The 
M2MI layer is then responsible for calling the appropriate method on the appropriate objects that have 
exported the interface contained in the received message.   
The following example helps illustrate how this works for omnihandles.  First, application A exports 
interface I with object O.  Assume interface I has method M.  This creates a mapping in the M2MI layer 
between interface I and object O.  Then, the M2MI layer creates a filter in the M2MP layer for interface I.  
Application B then creates an omnihandle for interface I, and invokes method M on the omnihandle.  The 
M2MI layer then creates a message containing the M2MI magic number, a hash code of the interface 
name associated with the omnihandle, and method M’s arguments.  The M2MP layer then broadcasts the 
message over the channel associated with the M2MP layer (this association is done at initialization time).  
The M2MP layer in application A receives the broadcast message, compares the magic number and 
interface name hash code from the message with those in its message filter list.  It finds a match, and 
sends the message up to the M2MI layer.  The M2MI layer then looks up the interface name in its export 
map, and finds object O.  The M2MI layer then invokes method M on object O. 
The above gives a basic example of how M2MI method invocation works with omnihandles.  
Multihandles and unihandles work a little differently.  With multihandles and unihandles, the sender and 
receivers need to know about each other.  For unihandles, one application will create a unihandle, 
associate it with an object that implements a particular interface, and send the unihandle to other 
applications.  The unihandle can be sent using another unihandle, a multihandle, or an omnihandle.  When 
the receiver receives the unihandle, it then has a handle to a single object that implements a particular 
interface.  When a method is invoked on that unihandle, a message is sent back to the application that 
associated an object to the handle, and the method invoked on the unihandle is then invoked on the object 
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associated with the unihandle in the original application.  The following example describes this in more 
detail. 
Application A creates a unihandle U for interface I, and associates it with object O (all done in one 
method call to the M2MI library).  Assume interface I contains method M.  Unihandles associate unique 
Exported Object IDs (EOIDs) with objects, instead of interface names.  The EOID for unihandle U and 
the object O are added to the export map in application A’s M2MI layer, and a message filter is added to 
the M2MP layer that contains the EOID for unihandle U and the M2MI magic number.  Application A 
then creates an omnihandle to another interface J.  Application A then invokes a method N on the 
omnihandle, passing unihandle U as an argument.  The unihandle is then sent to all applications that 
exported interface J.  Application B is one of those applications that exported interface J.  Application B 
receives unihandle U, as described in the above omnihandle example.  Application B then invokes 
method M on unihandle U.  This causes the M2MI layer in application B to create a message that contains 
the M2MI magic number, the EOID of unihandle U, and the arguments to method M.  The M2MP layer 
then broadcasts the message over the channel associated with the M2MP layer (this association is done at 
initialization time).  When application A  receives this message, the M2MP layer matches the magic 
number and EOID with one of its message filters, and sends the message up to the M2MI layer.  The 
M2MI layer then finds the EOID in its export map, which maps to object O.  The M2MI layer then 
invokes method M on object O. 
Multihandles work very similar to unihandles.  Like unihandles, multihandles have a unique EOID.  
Multihandles must also be created in one application and sent to other applications (or to other objects 
within the same application).  However, unlike unihandles which can only be associated with a single 
object, multihandles can be associated with multiple objects.  A multihandle can be created in application 
A and associated with object X, send to application B and associated with object Y, sent to application C 
and associated with object Z, and so on.  Any of the applications that receive the multihandle can invoke a 
method on that handle, say method M.  A message is created with the EOID of the multihandle, and 
broadcast on the channel associated with the M2MP layer.  All applications that received the multihandle 
and associated objects with the multihandle, will have method M invoked on their object, i.e. X.M, Y.M, 
and Z.M will all be invoked. 
3 Issues Addressed in this Project 
The following issues were addressed in order to establish a secure connection and achieve the basic 
security requirements of identification, data confidentiality, and data integrity.  Each issue is described in 
later subsections, as referenced by each issue. 
x Establish a group authentication key.  (Group Key Establishment) 
x Maintain the group authentication key.  (Group Key Management) 
x Establish a communication session key.  (Session Key Establishment) 
x Encrypt/decrypt M2MI method invocations.  (M2MI Integration) 
The above basic issues can be broken down into more detailed issues.  These detailed issues are described 
in subsections referenced by each detailed issue. 
x How to handle multiple devices starting a communication session at the same time.  (Multiple 
Startup) 
x How to merge communication sessions that use the same group authentication key, but were formed 
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separately from each other.  (Group Merge) 
x Rolling over communication session keys so that the same session key is not used for long periods of 
time.  (Key Rollover) 
x Defining/choosing an encryption/decryption algorithm that can be implemented on small devices.  
(Encryption Algorithm) 
x Differentiating between M2MI messages encrypted with the session key and random messages sent 
by an impostor.  (Impostor Detection) 
x Measuring memory and CPU usage to determine if the algorithms developed are appropriate for small 
devices.  (Measurements) 
Finally, in order to show that this project works, test clients were developed in order to show the full 
integration of the secure channel.  Many of these test clients were derived from existing M2MI test 
clients.  (Test Client) 
3.1 Group Key Establishment 
A significant amount of research was performed on this project to determine how to establish a group key.  
Several techniques were reviewed, including some that are being developed at RIT.  Due to the variety of 
techniques available, and the current research at RIT related to this topic, this issue was left out of the 
scope of this project.  Some of the findings are discussed in this section and the next section.  However, 
for purposes of limiting the scope of this project, and not interfering with other research at RIT, it is 
assumed that the group authentication key will be established by other means outside of this project, and 
that the authentication key will be available on the device for the software developed on this project to 
access. 
The rest of this section gives a brief discussion of some of the methods that could be used to establish a 
group authentication key.  This discussion is broken down into two sections.  The first discusses the 
traditional approach of using a central server for maintaining the group keys.  The second discusses the 
establishment of a group key among a group of communicating devices, where each node plays a part in 
defining the group key. 
3.1.1 Central Server Approach 
This approach assumes that a central server maintains the group authentication key, which is downloaded 
to devices that want to perform secure M2MI.  The method of downloading the key may vary between 
devices, as described in this section. 
On some devices, a secure connection to a central server may be possible directly from the device (e.g. 
Public Key Infrastructure).  In this case, the device can establish the secure connection and download the 
group authentication key directly from the central server. 
On some devices, a secure connection to a central server may be impossible to establish directly from the 
device.  However, if the device has a direct connection to a PC host computer, e.g. cradle, IrDA, etc., the 
host computer can download the group authentication key from the central server, then download the 
group authentication key to the device. 
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3.1.2 Group Communication Approach 
There are many research projects that have defined methods for members of a communication group to 
establish a group key by each member of the group providing a piece of the key.  Some of these include 
one-way accumulators [BdM93], Group Diffie-Hellman [STW96], key agreement for dynamic peer 
groups [STW00], tree based Group Diffie-Hellman [KPT00], and algorithms based on zero knowledge 
proof of identity [FFS87].  Many of these approaches are depend on a reliable communication system, or 
for the authentication to be performed outside of the protocol they define.  These requirements were not 
acceptable for this project. 
3.2 Group Key Management 
The group authentication key(s) for a device is maintained in non-volatile memory on the device.  For 
purposes of this project, it is assumed that these keys will be stored in a disk file.  However, the interface 
for retrieving the group authentication key from non-volatile memory does not assume that it is a disk file.  
A class has been written that retrieves the authentication key.  This class currently retrieves it from a disk 
file, but this can be easily modified to retrieve it from some other storage facility. 
If members are added to or removed from the group, a new group authentication key should be 
established, and updated on the device.  This allows for forward and backward secrecy.  This step is 
outside the scope of this project. 
Any changes to a group authentication key will be propagated to the device using the same methods 
described in Section 3.1 Group Key Establishment. 
3.3 Session Key Establishment 
In order to provide the most flexibility to an application, the session key that will be used to encrypt and 
decrypt method invocations is maintained by each handle, and for each exported interface.  Whenever an 
application creates a handle or exports an interface, a session key for that handle/interface will be 
established.  This is handled automatically be the M2MI library, and a mapping is maintained in the 
library between a secure group name and the session key associated with that name, so that only one 
session key is generated per secure communication group. 
This section describes the protocol of establishing a session key.  This protocol takes place “under the 
hood” when a secure handle is created, or when an interface is exported using the secure methods of the 
M2MI library.  The new security methods of the M2MI library are discussed in Section 5 Detailed 
M2MI Changes. 
The following interface is used to establish a session key. 
interface SessionKeyEstablisher { 
 void requestSessionKey ( String groupName ); 




The secure M2MI library will use interface SessionKeyEstablisher to obtain a session key.  When a 
session key is created, the library will invoke method requestSessionKey on an omnihandle for 
interface SessionKeyEstablisher, so that all devices out there will process the invocation and 
potentially send back the session key.  A timer will then be set to limit the amount of time the device will 
wait to obtain a session key.  The library will also export an object that implements interface 
SessionKeyEstablisher.  If method reportSessionKey gets invoked on the exported object before 
the timer goes off, the timer will be canceled, and the session key received in reportSessionKey will 
be used as the session key.  If the timer goes off, the device will generate its own session key, and invoke 
reportSessionKey to tell any devices that might be out there that they have established a new session 
key. 
Each device will invoke reportSessionKey under the following conditions: 
x Upon reception of a requestSessionKey invocation, to let other devices know what the current 
session key is.  However, to avoid a broadcast storm [NTCS99], each device will create a short, 
random back-off timer.  When that timer expires, it will respond with a reportSessionKey 
invocation.  If the device receives a reportSessionKey invocation before the back-off timer 
expires, the timer will be canceled, and it will not invoke reportSessionKey. 
x Periodically, to help with merging of communication groups and to let other devices know that the 
key is still active. 
x After a given expiration period, at which point in time the device will generate a new session key and 
broadcast the new key.  Whenever a device receives a reportSessionKey with a higher key id, it 
will use the new session key and key id received, and reset its expiration timer.  This expiration timer 
is first set on the first reportSessionKey the device receives, or when the requestSessionKey 
timer expires.  It is reset every time a new key is received, or when it generates a new session key. 
More details on these and other conditions are provided in Section 3.5 Protocol Issues. 
3.4 M2MI Integration 
The existing M2MI library had to be modified extensively in order to continue to provide clients with the 
greatest flexibility, and maintain the same APIs that were already published by the M2MI library.  The 
details of these changes are provided in Section 5 Detailed M2MI Changes. 
3.5 Protocol Issues 
This section describes issues that need to be resolved during the project associated with the protocol used 
to establish a session key, as well as issues related to data confidentiality and data integrity.  The first 
paragraph of each of the following subsections describes the issue that needs to be resolved.  The 
remaining paragraphs in each subsection describe how these issues were resolved. 
3.5.1 Multiple Startup 
ISSUE:  If many clients startup at about the same time, how will they arrive at a single sessionKey? 
As described in Section 3.3 Session Key Establishment, each device will invoke requestSessionKey 
on an omnihandle for interface SessionKeyEstablisher, so that all devices out there will process the 
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invocation and potentially send back the session key.  Each device will then listen for a 
reportSessionKey invocation.  If a reportSessionKey invocation occurs within a given timeout 
period, the key received will be used as the current session key.  If no key is received, the device will 
create its own key with a unique key id, and broadcast the new key and key id using 
reportSessionKey.  If another device starts up about the same time, there are three possible outcomes: 
x Second device receives reportSessionKey of first device within its timeout period.  In this case, 
both devices will use the session key and key id sent by the first device. 
x Second device starts up before the first device, and declares its session key and key id before the first 
device times out waiting for reportSessionKey.  This is the same as case 1, but looking at it from 
the other device’s perspective. 
x Both devices timeout before receiving any reportSessionKey invocations.  In this case, both 
devices will invoke reportSessionKey.  In this case, the reportSessionKey invocation 
containing the largest key id wins.  The device receiving the larger key id will store the incoming key 
and key id. 
This scenario was given with two devices.  This could easily be extended to N devices by looking at any 
two devices in the set of N, and deciding the outcome of those two devices. 
3.5.2 Group Merge 
ISSUE:  If a session key has been established, and a new session key is being reported by 
reportSessionKey, how do these different “groups” get merged? 
x Nothing special needs to be done in this case.  If a device receives a reportSessionKey invocation 
with a larger key id than is currently associated with the current session key, the new session key 
becomes the current session key, and new key id is saved.  In other words, devices in the group that is 
using the smaller key id will replace their key and key ids with those of the key and key id associated 
with the larger key id. 
3.5.3 Key Rollover 
ISSUE:  In cryptography, the longer a key is used, the more likely it is that the key may be cracked.  The 
security package developed in this project must take care to limit the amount of time that a session key is 
used.  If a session key has been used for more than a fixed amount of time (which may be configurable), 
then it should invalidate its key and create a new session key.  This value is currently a hard coded 
constant.  This could easily be changed to be retrieved from a system property. 
x This is easily accomplished with this protocol.  When a device determines that its session key has 
been used for longer than its [configurable] amount of time (i.e. its expiration timer expires), it will 
generate a new session key and a new, higher, key id.  The new key and key id are then broadcast 
using reportSessionKey.  All other devices in the group will receive the new key id, see that it is 
larger, and switch over to using the new session key and key id.  The timeout used by each device 
will be based on a fixed timeout, but will have some randomness to try to reduce the probability that 
more than one device has its key expire at the same time.  If this isn’t done, it would be very likely 
that all devices expire their keys at about the same time, and they would all try to generate a new key, 
creating unnecessary network traffic. 
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3.5.4 Encryption Algorithm 
ISSUE:  Need to define or choose an encryption/decryption algorithm that can be implemented on small 
devices.  This algorithm should use fairly large keys for the group authentication key, and relatively small 
(64-256 bits) for the session key.  Perhaps the key sizes can be configurable, within these defined limits.  
The algorithm should be able to run on small devices, which means that it should be able to run in a 
reasonable amount of time on a slow CPU, and should not require a lot of memory to process.  The 
processing speed and memory requirement limits need to be defined. 
The Java 2 Standard Edition (J2SE) platform offers many standard encryption algorithms that can be used 
with the session key.  The Java 2 Micro Edition (J2ME) currently doesn’t support the cryptographic 
extensions available in the J2SE platform.  However, additional profiles are continuously being added to 
the J2ME platform.  One of these will eventually support the cryptographic needs of this project. 
For this project, the java.security and javax.crypto packages were used for implementing the 
encryption, decryption, and secure hash algorithms.  This project uses the SHA-1 secure hash algorithm 
for generating message digests.  This project uses DES for the encryption and decryption algorithm used 
with the session key.  These algorithms are stored as public constant strings in the SessionKey class of 
the edu.rit.m2mi.security package, and can easily be changed.  This project uses Triple-DES for the 
encryption and decryption algorithm used with the authentication key.  These algorithms are stored as 
public constant strings in the AuthenticationKey class of the edu.rit.m2mi.security package, and can 
easily be changed.   
3.5.5 Impostor Detection 
The security package should be able to differentiate between M2MI messages encrypted with the session 
key and random messages sent by an impostor. 
To overcome this issue, each message that needs to be encrypted will be sent through a one-way hash to 
create a fixed length message digest.  This message digest will be concatenated to the original message.  
The combined message and message digest will then be encrypted with the appropriate key (session key 
or group authentication key, depending on which type of message is being encrypted).  On the receiving 
end, the message will be decrypted with the appropriate key.  The message will be separated into the 
original message and the fixed length message digest.  The original message will be sent through the one-
way hash function, and compared with the message digest.  If they match, the message is authenticated, 
and can be used.  If they don’t match, the message is discarded. 
3.5.6 Data Integrity 
Messages sent with secure M2MI should be guaranteed to be delivered without modifications being made 
by an intruder. 
This issue is overcome by using the one-way hash described in Section 3.5.5 Impostor Detection.  By 
adding a message digest (the output of the one-way hash) to the message before encrypting the message, 
the receiver can be assured that the data is intact if the message decrypts successfully, and the message 
digest received matches the message digest that is computed from the received message. 
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4 Overview of M2MI Changes 
One of the goals of this project was to preserve the current APIs for M2MI intact, and to add APIs for 
performing secure M2MI.  Another goal of this project was to be able to use standard M2MI without 
having to import any of the security features that were added in this project.  This was accomplished by 
leaving all of the APIs in the standard M2MI alone, and to add a new object that defined the APIs for 
secure M2MI.  More details on these changes are covered later in this section. 
A third goal of this project was to leave the M2MP layer alone, and to only modify the M2MI layer.  This 
goal was achieved by defining a new message format that conformed to the requirements of the M2MP 
layer.  The M2MP layer requires the M2MI layer to define and register a MessageFilter object.  This 
message filter object encapsulates a message prefix.  When a message is received by the M2MP layer, the 
M2MP layer looks through all of its MessageFilter objects to find one that has a matching message prefix.  
If one is found, the message is passed up to the M2MI layer.   
For secure M2MI, the contents of the message prefix were changed to differentiate secure M2MI 
messages from standard M2MI messages.  This allowed the M2MP layer to remain unchanged, yet allow 
the M2MP layer to forward the messages to the secure M2MI code rather than the original M2MI code.   
The format of the message prefix is very similar to the message prefix of the original M2MI code.  The 
original message prefix contained a magic number and a hash code.  The magic number was a 4 byte 
representation of the string “M2MI”.  The hash code was a 4 byte hash code of either the Exported Object 
ID, or a 4 byte hash code of the interface name, depending on how the handle was exported.  These 
message prefixes are maintained, and are still used by the standard M2MI code.  The secure M2MI 
message prefix also has a magic number and a hash code.  The magic number for secure M2MI messages 
is a 4 byte representation of the string “M2MJ”.  The hash code is still 4 bytes, and is the sum on the same 
4 byte hash code as standard M2MI and the 4 byte hash code of the string representing the secure group 
name used to establish the session key. 
One major change to the M2MI library was the representation of a handle.  In standard M2MI, a handle 
encapsulates an interface name and an EOID.  When a message is sent using that handle, all objects that 
were exported using that same interface name or EOID will invoke the method defined in the message 
sent using that handle.  In secure M2MI, the handle still encapsulates the interface name and EOID.  
However, the handle also encapsulates a secure group name.  The secure group name is a string that 
represents the name of the security group that is communicating with the same session key, and whose 
members share a common authentication key.  When methods are invoked on that handle, the messages 
are encrypted using a session key associated with that secure group name.  In addition to serving to 
lookup the session key, the secure group name is placed  into the messages that represent that method 
invocation, and, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, its hash code is part of the message prefix of the 
message containing the method invocation. 
The recipient of the secure method invocation message will then use the hash code of the secure group 
name and the EOID or interface name to lookup a message filter associated with that hash code.  Once 
found, the secure group name will be used to lookup the session key in the receiver so that the message 
can be decrypted and authenticated. 
x While the representation of the handle has changed, and the base class for all handles has changed, 
the user will still interface with the unihandle, multihandle, and omnihandle classes.  When a user 
creates one of these handles, the secure M2MI code will synthesize the appropriate handle class (uni-, 
multi-, or omni-handle), but instead of these handles being derived from a BaseHandle class, which 
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does the encapsulation of the EOID and interface name, these handle classes will be derived from a 
SecureHandle class, which encapsulates the EOID, interface name, and secure group name.  The 
SecureHandle also knows to use the new secure M2MI methods for sending method invocations so 
that the method invocations will be encrypted and decrypted. 
The last major change that is exposed to the user is the API for exporting objects and creating handles.  
There are many methods available in standard M2MI for exporting objects and creating handles.  All of 
these methods are still available in secure M2MI, but each method requires an additional parameter, the 
secure group name.  For instance, when an object is exported, the user would pass the interface name that 
the object implements, the object itself, and the secure group name. 
5 Detailed M2MI Changes 
Where possible, the existing M2MI code was used as is.  However, in order reduce the amount of 
duplicated coded, many of the classes were modified.  Many of the classes were modified simply to 
change the protection on data members or methods from private to protected, so that classes could extend 
the standard M2MI functionality to add security features.  In one case, the M2MI class, the guts of the 
class were moved to a base class, M2MIBase, to share the functionality between the standard M2MI and 
secure M2MI implementations. 
For a complete description of the public interfaces to the objects modified or added to the M2MI library, 
please refer to the javadoc included in the updated M2MI library.  This section describes the changes to 
the existing classes, and provides an overview of each of the classes that were added. 
x The original M2MI class contained the interfaces for initializing the M2MI library, exporting objects, 
unexporting objects, creating handles, and various internal methods.  This class maintained a 
reference to the underlying M2MP layer, using the Protocol object.  This class also performed the 
synthesis of MethodInvoker classes, which perform the actual method invocations on objects.  All 
interaction with the underlying M2MP layer and synthesis of MethodInvoker classes has been 
moved to a new M2MIBase class.  The rest of the functionality is maintained in what is left of the 
original M2MI class, which now extends M2MIBase.  This functionality is duplicated in a new 
SecureM2MI class, but with the addition of requiring a secure group name to interfaces for exporting 
and unexporting objects, and for creating handles.  In addition, many of the internal methods also 
require a secure group name. 
x The original M2MI library used an ExportMap to map an interface name or EOID to the object or set 
of objects that were exported.  A new SecureExportMap was created to map the combined interface 
name/secure group name, or EOID/secure group name, to the object or set of objects the were 
exported for the secure group name.  The original ExportMap was left mostly untouched. 
x The original M2MI library used a HandleSynthesizer class to synthesize unihandles, 
multihandles, and omnihandles.  These handles all extended from a base class called BaseHandle.  
A new SecureHandleSynthesizer class was added, which is extended from 
HandleSynthesizer.  The HandleSynthesizer class contains the same methods as before, and 
many of the methods are reused by the SecureHandleSynthesizer class.  Some of the methods in 
HandleSynthesizer has to be modified to allow for more commonality.  The main functionality 
added by SecureHandleSynthesizer was for synthesizing the SecureHandle base class.  To 
reiterate, all secure M2MI handles, i.e. unihandle, multihandles, and omnihandles, extend from a 
SecureHandle, instead of a BaseHandle.  The SecureHandle class also extends from 
16 
BaseHandle, which means that all secure M2MI handles are also BaseHandles, and are also 
SecureHandles. 
x The original M2MI library had a HandleFactory class, which was used by the M2MI class to create 
handles.  The HandleFactory would then use the HandleSynthesizer class for synthesizing 
actual handle classes..  A new SecureHandleFactory was created to create secure handles.  This 
new SecureHandleFactory uses the SecureHandleSynthesizer to synthesize actual secure 
handle classes. 
x A new interface, SessionKeyEstablisher, was added to support session key establishment.  See 
Section 3.3 Session Key Establishment for a description of this interface. 
x A new class, CipherSet, was added to implement interface SessionKeyEstablisher.  This class 
handles the establishment of the session key.  An instance of this class is created for each secure 
group name.  It maintains the session key for the group, and refreshes that key when it expires.  This 
class implements the protocol for establishing and maintaining a session key, and handles all of the 
protocol issues.  It uses a few helper classes defined in the edu.rit.m2mi.security package. 
x A new class, SessionKeyManager, was added to provide a mapping between a secure group name, 
and the CipherSet that encapsulates the session key for that secure group name.  When the 
application wants to encrypt or decrypt a message, it will ask the SessionKeyManager for the 
CipherSet associated with the secure group name for the message.  If none exist, a new one will be 
created.  If one already has been created, it will be returned.  It will then use the CipherSet object to 
encrypt or decrypt the message.  When the secure M2MI layer is done encrypting/decrypting the 
message, it will notify the SessionKeyManager that it is done with the CipherSet. 
6 Test Clients 
To test the security features of this project, two of the existing M2MI test clients were modified.  These 
are the Ping Pong program, and the Chat program.  These changes, and what they test, are described in 
the following subsections. 
6.1 Secure Ping Pong 
x The original Ping Pong programs had a single interface, PingPong.  It had two programs, Ping, and 
Pong, which implemented the PingPong interface.  The Ping program would print out a “Ping” 
message every time it received the method invocation for ping().  It would then sleep 1 second, then 
invoke method pong() on an omnihandle that it created at startup.  The Pong program would print out 
a “Pong” message every time it received the method invocation for pong().  It would then sleep 1 
second, then invoke method ping() on an omnihandle that it created at startup.  This is a simple test 
program for testing omnihandles. 
x The Secure Ping Pong programs use the same PingPong interface, but create secure omnihandles, 
and export an object implementing the PingPong interface using secure M2MI. 
x In addition to these simple test programs, two new programs were created: a PingMonitor program, 
and a SecurePingMonitor program.  These two programs export interface PingPong, just like the 
Ping/Pong/SecurePing/SecurePong programs do.  However, these programs are passive.  They 
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don’t respond to the incoming messages.  Instead, they display all messages coming in, as follows.  If 
a byte in the incoming message is in the range ‘ ‘ to ‘z’, it is displayed as a character.  Otherwise, it is 
displayed in hex.  For the standard PingMonitor program, three strings can be recognized in the 
output.  These include the magic number “M2MI”, the interface name, and the method being invoked.  
Here is sample output from this test program: 
< /127.0.0.1:5678 a386e3e180000M2MI9cebac2000000000000000001aedu.rit. 
m2mi.test.PingPong04ping04(I)V000aaced05w40001dc8d 
Received Ping 1 
x For the SecurePingMonitor, two strings can be recognized, the magic number “M2MJ”, and the 
secure group name.  The rest of the message is encrypted, and is not recognizable.  This makes this 
program a good demo program for showing that the messages being transmitted are being encrypted.  
Here is sample output from this test program (this test client uses myPingPongGroup as the secure 
group name): 




Received Ping 1 
Notice that even though the message dump only has two recognizable strings, the program was still able 
to decipher the message and display the correct output. 
The secure M2MI code was written to retrieve the authentication key from a file.  It defaults to a file in 
the user’s home directory called “auth_key”.  The user may override this default behavior by defining a 
system property of “AUTH_KEY_FILE”, and specifying the path to the file containing the authentication 
key.  This behavior is used to test Intruder Detection.  The following procedure was used to test this: 
1) A SecurePing program was started with authentication key A, group name G. 
2) A SecurePong program was started with authentication key B, group name G. 
3) A SecurePong program was started with authentication key A, group name G. 
4) A SecureStartPingPong program was started with authentication key A, group name G. 
The output of the programs that started with authentication key A all output the same results as if the 
SecurePong program using authentication key B wasn’t running.  The SecurePong program using 
authentication key B displayed error messages when it tried to decrypt the session key received, even 
though it was using the same group name. 
6.2 Secure Chat 
The original Chat program had a single interface, Chat.  It also had a single program named ChatDemo, 
which implemented a rudimentary chat program.  This chat program allowed the user to type in a text 
message.  When the user pressed enter, the message (and username) was broadcast to all objects 
implementing interface Chat.  The ChatDemo program also exported an object that implemented the Chat 
interface, and displayed all messages received on that interface.  The Chat program is discussed in the 
M2MI OOPSLA paper [KD02]. 
A secure Chat program was developed, which adds a little more functionality to the original functionality, 
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besides adding encryption.  In order to test multihandles, a test client needed to be developed that 
broadcast messages on multihandles.  To do this, the secure chat program uses multihandles to send 
messages to each other.  These multihandles are passed around among applications using the first 
ChatDiscovery interface defined in the M2MI OOPSLA paper [KD02] (the one that only has a report 
method, not the one that has request and report methods). 
When the secure chat program starts, it takes as command line parameters a user name, a secure group 
name, and a session name.  It uses the secure group name to create a secure omnihandle for interface 
ChatDiscovery.  It uses the secure group name to export interface ChatDiscovery.  It then waits up to 15 
seconds for somebody to report a multihandle for the same session name it was started with.  If a 
multihandle is received with the same session name, and a multihandle hasn’t already been created/saved, 
the incoming multihandle is saved.  If no multihandle is received with the same session name after the 
timeout period, a new multihandle is created and saved.  When the new multihandle is created, the 
applications starts periodically invoking report on its omnihandle for interface ChatDiscovery.  While this 
is not a complete implementation of the ChatDiscovery interface, it is sufficient for testing secure 
multihandles, which was the goal of this test client. 
The rest of the secure chat program is the same as the original chat program.  A user may enter messages, 
and when they press enter, the message is broadcast on the secure multihandle that was created/received 
at startup.  Whenever a chat message is received on its securely exported Chat object, the message (if 
decrypted successfully) is displayed to the user. 
Like the Secure Ping Pong program, a monitor program was written for the Secure Chat program.  This 
monitor program is similar to the Secure Chat program, except instead of displaying messages to the user, 
it displays the raw message (in the same fashion that the Secure Ping Pong program does), and displays 
the text message sent as an argument to the method invoked on the secure multihandle. 
7 Measurements 
In order to ensure that this package will work on a small device, the following measurements were taken 
and evaluated. 
7.1 Code Size 
This measurement is used to determine the amount of memory required to store the M2MI code.  The 
code size was measured before and after the security changes were added.  The results are given in the 
table below. 
 
Old Code Size New Code Size 
504832 Bytes 599040 Bytes 
Table 1 - Code Size Deltas 
The code size was increased by approximately 19%.  While this is significant, it isn’t overwhelming. 
7.2 Session Key Memory Usage 
This measurement determines the amount of RAM needed to store all key related structures.  The actual 
memory used cannot be determined.  The Java language does not provide a method for determining the 
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size of an object.  It does provide methods for serializing objects, provided that all of the objects are 
serializable.  Serializing the object converts it to a byte array, whose length can be retrieved.  However, 
some of the Java classes that were used were not serializable, so even the serialized size could not be 
determined.  So, instead of providing the amount of memory used, this section describes the steps taken to 
minimize the amount of memory used. 
The CipherSet class stores the session key, along with other fields required to maintain that session key.  
In order to minimize memory usage, a map was created that mapped a group name to the CipherSet, so 
that only one CipherSet is created per group name used.  If an application exports multiple objects 
using the same group name, they will all use the same CipherSet, and the same session keys.  If that 
same object creates a handle with the same group name, it will also use the same CipherSet. 
Each CipherSet has 3 copies of the session key.  One is stored in encrypted format so that any requests 
for the current session key can be answered without having to re-encrypt the session key.  The other two 
copies are stored in the encrypt Cipher and the decrypt Cipher.  These objects are required for performing 
the encryption and decryption routines.  The number of copies of the session key could be reduced to 2 by 
not caching the encrypted session key.  However, a performance hit would be taken whenever the session 
key needs to be reported, since the session key would then need to be encrypted with the large 
authentication key before sending. 
7.3 Non-Volatile Memory Usage 
This measurement determines the amount of NVRAM needed by this package.  This includes the amount 
of memory needed to store the group authentication keys.  The amount needed will vary from device to 
device, depending on how many groups the user of each device belongs to.  This amount is also 
dependent on the authentication key size, which is hard-coded in this project, but could be easily adjusted. 
This project uses DESede (a.k.a. Triple-DES).  The group authentication key size used can vary.  A good 
strength key is approximately 1024 bits, or 128 bytes.  This key needs to be stored, as well as the group 
name to associate with it.  The group name can vary greatly, and is not limited by the application.  The 
total NVRAM needed would be based on the following calculation: 
#groups * (authKeySize + average(groupNameLength)) 
For instance, if a user belonged to 20 groups, the authKeySize was 1024 bits, and the groupNameLength 
average size was 64 bytes, the total amount of storage required (if stored unencrypted) would be less than 
4 KB. 
The important factor here is that the user does not need to maintain a separate key for each user that they 
wish to communicate with.  They only need to maintain a separate key for each group that they belong to, 
which is typically much smaller. 
7.4 Session Key Generation Time 
This measurement determines the amount of time required to initialize the security objects and to 
exchange messages in order to establish the initial session key.  This time was measured with various 
numbers of clients wishing to join a communication group at the same time.  This time will be called the 
startup time in this section. 
For the first application to startup with a given session key, the startup time varied from 15-25 seconds.  
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Part of that time is a 5 second key wait time that the first application must wait before generating the 
session key. 
For applications that start later, the startup times varied from 10 seconds to 15 seconds, and was not 
affected by the number of clients running.  This makes sense, since the startup time is dependent on the 
time to complete initialization methods (fixed amount of time within the process) plus the time to send a 
request, that request to be processed by one receiver, and one response message.  Since only one receiver 
responds, only one set of messages are exchanged. 
Most of he variability in these timing measurements is explained by the use of a backoff timer.  In order 
to prevent a flood of responses to key requests, a backoff timer was used, which ranges from 0 to 3 
seconds. 
7.5 Message Encryption & Decryption Time 
This measurement determines the amount of time required to encrypt or decrypt a message.  This time 
was measured with small and large messages on a Sun Ultrasparc workstation.  Encryption and 
decryption times were approximately the same, +/- 1 msec of each other. 
 
Message Size Encryption/Decryption Time 
10 Bytes 1 millisecond 
10000 Bytes 20 milliseconds 
Table 2 - Message Encryption and Decryption Time 
For small packets, the throughput was about 10 Kbytes/sec.  For large packets, the throughput was about 
500 Kbytes/sec. 
Most method invocations will be under 2 Kbytes.  So, if the embedded device was 20 times slower than 
the workstation, it could encrypt and decrypt a 4 KB message at the rate of about 5 per second. 
8 Future Work 
This project has integrated encryption into M2MI, assuming that an authentication key has already been 
established for the device running secure M2MI.  Work is still needed to establish the authentication key 
on the device, either from downloading from a host PC, or some other means.  See [Bi03] for one way 
that this might be done (note that this reference is to a thesis that is work in progress). 
Work needs to be done to store the group authentication key on the device in a secure way, so that 
hackers can’t view the authentication key/keys.  The current implementation assumes that group 
authentication key is stored in a plaintext file. 
As with the rest of M2MI, this project currently relies on the J2SE platform.  In order to port this to an 
embedded device, a device profile needs to be created that supports some of the javax.crypto package, 
and other packages/classes used that are not available in the J2ME platform. 
There is a small possibility that messages may be dropped when the session key expires, and new keys are 
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being exchanged.  The key exchange messages won’t be dropped, but clients using the old key will not be 
able to decrypt messages transmitted with the new key, and vice versa.  This could be partially fixed by 
caching the previous session key, and if the decryption fails with the current key, attempt to decrypt with 
the previous key.  This will fix the case where a client with a new key receives a message encrypted with 
the old key, but not vice versa.  To fix the other case, where a message encrypted with a new key is 
received prior to receiving the new key, might be more difficult.  In order to make some of the encryption 
and decryption methods thread safe, some of the methods were synchronized.  This may prevent the key 
from being received before returning from the decrypt methods.  This work is beyond the scope of this 
project, but would be a good area for enhancement. 
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